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THE STATUS OF CORPORATIONS IN THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF 
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE SEARCH FOR PERSONHOOD 
Michael J. Kelly* 
Can corporations be prosecuted for complicity in genocide? While 
companies do not typically carry out genocides on their own, they often 
provide the necessary means such as supplying Saddam Hussein with chem-
ical gas components to perpetrate the Kurdish genocide, machetes to the 
Rwandan government to further the Rwandan genocide, or small arms to 
Bosnian Serb militias to exterminate Bosniak males at Srebrenica.1  
Pursuit of this deceptively simple question leads into a complex 
scholarly inquiry.2 One aspect of this inquiry, and the subject of this short 
essay, is whether the drafters of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide (Genocide Convention) conceived that such might 
be the case.3 After all, while corporations like Krupps were implicated at 
Nuremberg, it was only individual corporate officers, not the companies, 
that were formally prosecuted for crimes amounting to genocide.4 
In 2007, the International Court of Justice held that states could 
commit genocide.5 So if states can commit genocide, then, logically, why 
cannot other legal persons, namely corporations? 
  
 *  Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research & International Programs, 
Creighton University School of Law. Professor Kelly is President of the U.S. National Chap-
ter of L‘Association Internationale de Droit Pénal (AIDP) and a member of the International 
Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS). The author notes with profound thanks the work 
of Hirad Abtahi and Philippa Webb in developing and publishing the travaux of the Geno-
cide Convention, which aided the examination of this essay‘s central question immeasurably. 
 1 See Norm Dixon, How the U.S. Armed Sadaam Hussein with Chemical Weapons, 
GREEN LEFT WEEKLY (Aug. 28, 2002), http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/26825 (explaining 
how the United States helped Iraq develop its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons 
programs). See LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER—THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 56 
(Verson 2006) (explaining how corporations supplied weapons that were used in the Rwan-
dan genocide). 
 2 Other equally important threshold questions concerning the status of corporations under 
international law, amenability to prosecution, and tribunal jurisdiction are pursued elsewhere 
and not covered in this segment of the broader inquiry.  
 3 See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (defining genocide to be a 
crime under international law in times of peace or in times of war). 
 4 See Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International 
Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1105–1111 (2009). 
 5 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶¶ 143, 413 (Feb. 26), 
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First, what is genocide? The illegal acts of genocide are defined in 
the Genocide Convention: 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following 
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic-
al, racial or religious group, as such:  
 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the     
  group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-    
  lated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the       
  group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
6
  
Second, who can commit genocide? Article 6 of the Genocide Con-
vention covers individual responsibility: ―Persons committing genocide or 
any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether 
they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private indi-
viduals.‖7 There is no artificial distinction between natural or legal (juridi-
cal) in either the reference to ―persons‖ or ―private individuals,‖ whereas 
such distinction is specifically made in later international criminal treaties. 
Thus, corporate liability could therein lurk. 
An exploration of what the Genocide Convention drafters were 
thinking does not dampen this prospect. The authoritative interpretive guide 
to treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, urges one to first 
look to the plain meaning of the words in the treaty and, should ambiguity 
remain, to resort to an examination of the preparatory notes to divine the 
drafters‘ intent.8 During the exact period when the Genocide Convention 
was being negotiated from 1946–1948, the legal definition of ―person‖ ac-
cording to Ballentine was: 
Persons are divided by law into persons natural and persons artifi-
cial, and  ‗person‘ prima facie, at common law and apart from any statutory 
  
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (deciding that under Article I of 
the Genocide Convention, states are obligated not to commit genocide and that under Article 
IX of the Convention, the ICJ has jurisdiction to decide a state‘s responsibility for commit-
ting genocide in violation of the Convention). 
 6 Genocide Convention, supra note 3, art II. 
 7 Id. art. VI. 
 8 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31–32, done May 23, 1969, 23 U.S.T. 
3227, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
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enactment,  includes both natural and artificial persons, and therefore as a 
general rule  includes corporations.9 
Moreover, the criminal versus civil nature of the Genocide Conven-
tion was not dispositive as to whether corporations would be included in the 
term ―person,‖ according to the usage of the term well prior to time of the 
drafting conference: 
Corporations are to be deemed and considered as persons when the cir-
cumstances  in which they are placed are identical with those of natural 
persons expressly  included in a statute; and prima facie the word ‗person‘ 
in a statute, though penal,  which is intended to inhibit an act, means ‗per-
son in law;‘ that is, an artificial, as  well as a natural, person, and therefore 




References to corporations or legal or juridical persons in the tra-
vaux preparatoires is meager. But, as the above commentary makes clear, 
in conjunction with the discussion of who could commit genocide, it was on 
the minds of several delegates. Specifically, the Soviet delegate emphasized 
corporate liability in the context media and press organizations using propa-
ganda to incite to genocide.11 The delegate was also in favor of blanket ap-
plication of liability, ―stress[ing] the fact that the fundamental idea of article 
V [liability] of the draft convention was to proclaim that all those commit-
ting genocide, no matter who they were, should be punished.‖12 
  
 9 13 AM. JUR. Corporations § 9 (1938). BALLENTINE‘S LAW DICTIONARY 622 (2d ed. 
1948). This understanding reflects a long history recognizing that both rights and duties 
devolve onto corporations as legal persons. See HORACE L. WILGUS, CASES ON THE GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§1–10 (1902). 7 CORPORATIONS 
REPRINTED FROM RULING CASE LAW §3 (1915) (―The corporation is the real though artificial 
person substituted for the natural persons who procured its creation . . . It must do all corpo-
rate acts in its corporate name. . . . Neither a portion nor all of the natural persons who com-
pose a corporation . . . are the corporation itself. . . .‖). See also id. at §8 (where corporations 
were held by courts to constitute ―persons‖ as that term was used in the 5th and 14th Amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution and in an 1873 treaty between the United States and England 
prohibiting future confiscations, and §9 reiterating that corporations should be presumed 
covered in statutory language). 
 10 CORPORATIONS REPRINTED, supra note 9, §9. 
 11 1 HIRAD ABTAHI AND PHILIPPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX 
PREPARATOIRES 741–49 (2008). The Soviet delegate also introduced a new article contem-
plating organizational liability for organizations that ―aimed at stirring up racial, national or 
religious hatred and inciting to commission of acts of genocide‖ but this motion was de-
feated. Id. at 1799–1814. Although the proposal was explained by the Czech delegate to 
encompass only groups like the Gestapo, the S.A., and the S.S., the United States stridently 
opposed it as an assault on freedom of the press. Id. at 1809. 
 12 Id. at 1591–92 (emphasis added). 
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Other delegates made oblique references to legal persons in the con-
text of the debate over the term ―constitutionally responsible rulers.‖13 
Whether such references reflected an intentional application to the corporate 
body considered in this essay or to governments in their corporate context 
remains an open question. The delegates certainly referred to governments 
and states, as the U.S. delegate reflected on the 96th meeting, ―It had then 
been decided that corporate bodies such as Governments and States should 
not be included in the list of those to be held responsible for the commission 
of genocide.‖14 But did these references embrace companies? We simply do 
not know. 
For instance, the Venezuelan delegate was skeptical about bringing 
legal persons before an international tribunal, noting, ―it was easy to picture 
the difficulty of bringing judgment the corporate bodies which, as a general 
rule, were the perpetrators of the crime of genocide.‖15 The Swedish dele-
gate favored an interpretation limiting liability due to the fact that ―the 
Swedish criminal code did not recognize the idea of penal responsibility of 
legal persons‖—a position echoed by the delegate from the Dominican Re-
public.16 And the French delegate noted that ―The French idea of penal re-
sponsibility applied to individuals only, for only individuals could commit 
crimes; it could not apply to corporate bodies or to abstract communities.‖17 
But the delegate from the Philippines declared that ―any individual 
guilty of genocide should be punished, whoever he might be.‖18 And, final-
ly, summing up the debate, the delegate from Luxembourg said: ―The ques-
tion under consideration was to decide who would be liable to punishment 
for the crime of genocide. [T]he Committee had decided that all individuals, 
whether they were constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or 
private individuals, would be responsible for the act of genocide.‖19 
So inclusion of corporations in the term ―persons‖ is not foreclosed 
by a reading of the travaux; nor is inclusion of corporations in the term 
―private individuals.‖20 Indeed, the Chinese delegate noted that ―genocide 
  
 13 Id. at 1592–96. 
 14 Id. at 1694. 
 15 Id. at 1222. Although the Venezuelan delegate could have been referring to states and 
governments by using the term corporate bodies, this is somewhat unclear as reference is 
made by other delegates to states and heads of states as chief perpetrators of genocide. See, 
e.g., the statement of the Pakistani delegate, id. at 1595 (noting that, most often, genocide is 
committed by heads of state). 
 16 Id. at 1595, 1662 (―[U]nder the national legislation of his country, legal entities could 
not be held guilty of committing a crime‖). 
 17 Id. at 1617. Chaumont went on to endorse the phrase ―responsible rulers‖ for inclusion 
in draft article V. 
 18 Id. at 1642. 
 19 Id. at 1655 (emphasis added). 
 20 Id. at 1593–94. One of the few exclusionary elucidations on this last point came from 
the Syrian delegate who said, when considering what to do with de facto heads of state, ―they 
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could also be committed by private organizations.‖21 And the Swedish dele-
gate specifically included ―private organizations‖ in his references to ―pri-
vate individuals‖ in the debate beating back a French amendment to exclude 
private individuals from liability altogether: 
According to the French amendment, genocide could by committed only 
by rulers or at least with their connivance or collusion; acts of genocide 
committed by private individuals or by private organizations would not be 
subject to the terms of the convention . . . The Swedish delegation did not 
think that the force of the convention would be weakened if cases of geno-
cide committed by private individuals or private organizations were in-
cluded among the acts to which the convention applied. For one thing, it 
should not be forgotten that such cases might well occur. Furthermore, it 
should be kept in mind that . . . the draft convention . . . provided for the 
punishment of certain offences, such as direct instigation to commit geno-
cide, which preceded the crime and were generally committed by private 




Again, any indication of inclusion is merely speculative, as it was 
the Swedish delegate who reminded the drafters that legal persons could not 
be prosecuted in the discussion about heads of state, but then also coupled 
private organizations with private individuals.23 But there is equally no de-
finitive exclusion apparent in the travaux. Consequently, one may certainly 
argue that ―persons‖ and ―private individuals‖ does not preclude the inclu-
sion of corporations as legal persons.24 
  
would not be included in the category of ‗private individuals‘ envisaged in article V—since 
that category referred only to private individuals who were neither officials nor heads of 
State.‖ Id. at 1594. 
 21 Id. at 724. This was in the debate over what to do with political groups. Eventually 
political groups were specifically taken out as a protected class at the insistence of the So-
viets, but were arguably left in as potential perpetrators. Id. at 2029. The Chinese delegate 
also ―expressed doubts about the inclusion of both political groups and groups of opinion in 
the definition. If such groups were included, there was, in fact, no good reason why social, 
economic and other groups should not be included.‖ Id. at 724. 
 22 Id. at 1462 (emphasis added). In this same vein, the delegate from the Philippines ob-
served in a later debate on incitement, ―[E]ven from the political point of view, the prohibi-
tion of incitement to genocide by private individuals or groups acting independently of their 
Governments could only relieve international tension, and not increase it.‖ Id. at 1541. 
 23 Id. at 1462–63. The Swedish delegation was arguing against the French amendment and 
its exclusion of private individuals from Article II of the Convention. 
 24 Black‘s Law Dictionaries of the period are no help in resolving this matter. Both the 
third edition (1933) and the fourth edition (1951) track BALLENTINE‘s dichotomy (above), 
and note: 
It has been held that when the word person is used in a legislative act, natural persons will be 
intended unless something appear in the context to show that it applies to artificial persons 
(citations to court cases omitted). But as a rule corporations will be considered persons with-
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Not surprisingly, there is a split in the legal academic literature on 
this point. Some scholars, including the dean of Yale‘s law school, argue 
that corporations can aid or abet genocide under Article 4 of the Genocide 
Convention.25 Others have adopted a more restrictive interpretation of the 
list of possible perpetrators of genocide:  
The language of the Genocide Convention is indicative of an intention to 
confine liability under international law for acts of genocide to natural per-
sons only. It provides that ―persons‖ committing genocide, or any of the 
other acts included in the Genocide Convention‘s proscriptions, shall be 
punished. Although ―persons‖ as a juridical concept includes natural as 
well as juristic persons, the Article expressly refers to ―responsible rulers, 
public officials or private individuals‖ as examples of persons who might 
be punishable. Restrictive interpretation of this provision—the general 
norm of construction that applies to punitive provisions—and in particular 
application of the eiusdem generis rule, would suggest that an accused un-
der the Genocide Convention, ought to be confined to those who have 
something in common with ―responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals:‖ that is, natural persons to the exclusion of juristic persons, 
including the state as a corporate body with legal subjectivity.
26
 
Similarly, there is a split in the judiciary on the matter. District 
Court Judge Allen Schwartz used the argument to rebuff the corporate de-
fendant‘s assertion in Talisman Energy that the Nuremberg trials focused 
only on individual corporate officers and not the corporate entities them-
selves.27 Allegations of complicity in genocide had been leveled against the 
company in that case: 
  
in the statutes unless the intention of the legislature is manifestly to exclude them (citations 
to court cases omitted). 
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1355 (3d ed. 1933); BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1300 (4th ed. 
1951). As the travaux neither specifically includes nor excludes corporations in the term 
persons, assuming the drafting committee could be analogized to a legislature and the result-
ing draft treaty to a statute, the question remains unresolved. 
 25 Harold Hongju Ku, Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate Responsibility Liti-
gation, 7 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 263, 266 (2004). 
 26 Johan D. Van Der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 23 
FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 286, 290 (1999). See also, Ben Saul, In The Shadow Of Human Rights: 
Human Duties, Obligations, And Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 565, 
596 (2001) (―International human rights law presently recognizes the implied recognition of 
correlative duties owed to facilitate the exercise of specific rights. Yet many early human 
rights treaties were ‗silent as to the roles of other or alternative addressees in regard to pro-
moting and protecting specific rights.‘ For example, the Genocide Convention envisaged 
only the punishment of natural ‗persons,‘ and was silent on the responsibility of govern-
ments, corporations, media entities, or political parties.‖)(emphasis added). 
 27 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 316 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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The concept of corporate liability for jus cogens violations has its 
roots in the trials of German war criminals after World War II. The Nurem-
berg Charter permitted the prosecution of ―a group or organization‖ and 
allowed the tribunal to declare that entity a ―criminal organization.‖ In 
United States v. Flick, United States v. Krauch, and United States v. Krupp, 
the heads of major German corporations were prosecuted for, inter alia, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Talisman points out, correctly, that in 
each of these cases, individuals, and not corporate entities, were put on trial. 
However, it ignores the fact that the court consistently spoke in terms of 
corporate liability:  
With reference to the charges in the present indictment concerning Far-
ben‘s [a German corporation] activities in Poland, Norway, Alsace-
Lorraine, and France, we find that the proof establishes beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that offenses against property as defined in Control Council Law 
No. 10 were committed by Farben, and that these offenses were connected 
with, and an inextricable part of the German policy for occupied countries. 
[. . .]. The action of Farben and its representatives, under these circums-
tances, cannot be differentiated from acts of plunder or pillage committed 
by officers, soldiers, or public officials of the German Reich. [. . .] Such 
action on the part of Farben constituted a violation of the Hague Regula-
tions [on the conduct of warfare] (citing United States v. Krauch).
28
 
The language of the decision makes it clear that the court consi-
dered that the corporation qua corporation had violated international law. 
The same logic guided the court in a case involving the Krupp corporation:  
The confiscation of the Austin plant [a tractor factory owned by the Roth-
schilds] [. . .] and its subsequent detention by the Krupp firm constitute a 
violation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations [. . . and] the Krupp firm, 
through defendants[, . . .] voluntarily and without duress participated in 
these violations. (citing United States v. Krupp).
29
 
As in Krauch, the Krupp court makes it clear that while individuals 
were nominally on trial, the Krupp company itself, acting through its em-
ployees, violated international law. The Nuremberg precedent cited above is 
particularly significant not merely because it constitutes a basis for finding 
corporate liability for violations of international law, but because the lan-
guage ascribes to the corporations involved the necessary mens rea for the 
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity—the types of crim-
inal behavior at issue in the instant case.30 
  
 28 Id. at 315–16. 
 29 Id. at 316. 
 30 Id. at 315–16. 
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Thus, the concept of holding corporations accountable under inter-
national criminal law for their complicity in genocide has been around for 
some time, even if it has not been acted upon. While no currently consti-
tuted international tribunal would have jurisdiction over such a case, noth-
ing in the Genocide Convention appears to prevent one from commencing. 
This is an important point if, perhaps in the future, one of the competent 
international criminal tribunals is vested with that jurisdiction. 
Along with rights come responsibilities. The rights of corporations 
have expanded greatly in the age of globalization, but there has not been a 
commensurate effort to impose obligations—such as compliance with the 
jus cogens norm codified in the Genocide Convention against the commis-
sion of genocide. If corporations are ―persons‖ under the law, then they 
should be more fully so. If the result of holding corporations liable for their 
actions is the disarming of tyrants who seek to carry out genocide—few 
since the Second World War manufacture their own weapons—then perhaps 
fewer genocides would be committed, or at least the scale of massacre 
might be reduced. That result is certainly worth the effort. 
 
